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WHAT TOCQUEVILLE SAYS TO LIBERALS 
AND CONSERYATIYES TODAY
Russell Baker once said that in our time people cite Tocqueville without reading 
him even more than they do the Bibie and Shakespeare. Every American president 
sińce Eisenhower has ąuoted him, no doubt without reading him, and some of our 
professors, to say nothing of other citizens, have picked up their habit of fishing for 
what they like, and throwing back the rest, in Tocqueville’s great work Democracy 
in America.
It is no mystery why everyone wants Tocqueville’s support: his work is 
both the best book on democracy and the best book on America -  two subjects that 
for Americans, at least, are inseparable. We cannot fail to be interested in a book so 
renowned but because of a certain laziness whose source is our partisanship, we 
fail to read it through or read it carefully, lest we come upon something difficult to 
accept. The purpose here is not to invoke Tocqueville in a vain attempt to tran- 
scend partisanship, a possibility he rejected. But perhaps he can do something to 
raise the awareness of both liberals and conservatives, and get them to see that their 
own party, and not just the other party, has questions it needs to face.
We address liberals and conservatives rather than independents. Most 
thinking people are either liberals or conservatives, and most independents, instead 
of standing above party as they believe, actually pick from both parties unthink- 
ingly, trying to have their cake and eat it too. Tocqueville first lesson to our inde­
pendents is the inevitability of partisan opinion. For “in all free societies” he says, 
there exists a set of two opinions “as old as the world”. One wants to restrict 
“popular” or “public” power, the other to extend it indefinitely.
Clearly, the parties of Tocqueville’s France were not the same as Amer­
ica^ today. Then one party, nostalgie for the traditional order of hierarchy and 
religion, bitterly rejected the post-revolutionary order in toto, and the other party, 
zealously championing the Revolution’s principles of liberty, equality and frater-
nity, set itself in opposition to everything -  bad or good -  associated with the Old 
Regime. Despite the differences one may find, Tocqueville in fact has a good deal 
to say about the central doctrines of our conservatives and liberals -  self-interest 
for conservatives and community for liberals. Let us see what he would say to cur- 
rent promoters of these hot ideas.
We begin with conservatives, the party that would narrow popular or pub- 
lic power principally in the name of self-interest. This party, because of its own 
sometimes inept rhetoric as well as the caricature given it by its opposition, appears 
as the party of the rich and powerful. It is the party that has long defended “rugged 
individualism”, and is accused of protecting callous self-interest. Tocqueville is, of 
course, famous for his firm, if no heartfelt, embrace of the American doctrine of 
self-interest well understood. So he would seem to have much to say to any party 
that adopts the doctrine. Tocqueville’s defenders of self-interest argue firom its 
strength, and rather than urge men to deplore and transcend an inclination so pow­
erful, they defend its legitimacy. They hope to turn self-interest against itself by 
maintaining that one’ s own interest is, as a rule, best secured in pursuing a generał 
good. Well understood, self-interest even requires a certain degree of sacrifice. In 
the end, the doctrine may “form ... citizens who are regulated, temperate, moderate, 
farsighted, masters of themselves”. It is meant to provide a substitute for virtue, 
instilling the habits of virtue if not requiring elevated motives of generosity or pi- 
ous self-forgetting. It does not reject religion, but finds it useful for a human pur- 
pose. Rather than defining self-interest as obedience to God, the doctrine goes so 
far as to interpret hopes for the afterlife as an aspect of self-interest.
Self-interest well understood, Tocqueville says, is the morał doctrine best 
suited to the needs of modern democratic life. His endorsement of it is, however, 
qualified in several ways that are useful to recall. He never justifies the pursuit of 
self-interest for its own sake, but only as the best means available to our moralists 
of encouraging “association”. Further, he believes that the doctrine will work only 
when supported by free political institutions. Third, he stresses that the principle is 
democratic, as do today’s conservatives, because it is within the reach of all. But 
by the same token, he recognizes that it will not inspire great virtue or even true 
virtue. In fact, he suggests that it may do little to sustain one aspect of virtue that 
ought to be within reach of almost all democratic citizens, namely courage. Finally, 
the doctrine is not quite true. Tocqueville does not try to deny, like some free- 
market economists, that everyone has an interest in the common good. On the con- 
trary, he affirms that some concem for the good of others is a part of human naturę, 
a spontaneous impulse rather than behavior leamed by adhering to a doctrine.
American conservatives today hardly dare profess any determination to re- 
strict popular power: democratic feeling is too strong for that. But they seek to 
narrow or contain public power, especially that of the national govemment. In the 
form that they espouse the doctrine of self-interest well understood, they want to 
bolster local and State governments, but even more, they promote private economic 
enterprise together with the exercise of religion. Here, we know, are the two chief 
components of the Republican party, economic libertarians and religious or social
conservatives. Their cooperation, Tocqueville saw, is more than just an uneasy 
alliance reąuiring luck or extraordinary political skill. The alliance has a common 
ground in the shared desire to restrict public power, even if each component wants 
to protect a quite distinct sphere from govemment interference.
As their critics point out, conservatives fail to see clearly that an interested 
self is not necessarily a strong self. Today Americans pride themselves on their 
“individualism”, which they understand in a strong sense. But TocquevilIe uses the 
term pejoratively to refer to the weakness of individuals in a democratic society. 
Democratic individuals, suppose themselves to be independent, but in fact they are 
incapable of providing for their own well-being, still less for society as a whole. He 
fmds something positive in the desire for independence, in the determination to 
“get government off our backs”. It is not, however, the mere hostility to govem- 
ment that conservatives often convey. Instead, he sees an inchoate aspiration for 
free political institutions in which citizens can be active participants.
Thus there is an important place in a democracy for a party of community 
to articulate longstanding goals of liberals: security for all, compassion for those in 
nee, fuli and equal participation of all citizens in social and political life.
On behalf of liberals Tocqueville willingły affirms -  no smali concession 
to them -  the justice of democratic equality. So why should popular power, the 
power of all the people equally, not extend indefinitely? Neither does he deny -  
how could anyone? -  that security is a legitimate concem. And even as he holds 
that self-interest well understood is the most suitable morał doctrine for modem 
times, he acknowledges that the mores, that is “habits of the heart”, will increas- 
ingly be shaped by a disposition to compassion. These two inclinations, self- 
interest and compassion, are by no means incompatible. Democracy’s increasingly 
equal and similar citizens can all but “feel the pain” of their fellows, and they will 
readily come to their assistance in case of need because they can identify with 
them, imagining themselves in trouble and needing help. Democratic citizens tend 
to experience their common humanity as a common neediness. Thus the compas- 
sionate concem they express for the security and dignity of the disadvantaged and 
elderly, or of elderly parents left fmancially dependent on their own children, is 
also a matter of present or potentiał interest to everyone.
With liberals, Tocqueville shares a critique of “the market”, whose unfail- 
ing beneficence and sufficiency is often assumed by conservatives. He foresees as 
clearly as did Marx the cruel indifference to others of modem meritocratic elites. 
Yet he fully appreciates that the desire for materiał goods sustaining the modem 
market is not only universal, but especially characteristic of the middle class. And 
unlike liberał wishful-thinkers, he doubts that the demand for materiał goods can 
be effectively met without generating considerable inequalities. Restiveness drove 
earlier generations of Americans to the western frontier with an avaricious energy 
that Tocqueville calls a “sort of heroism”. Today Americans are still restive with 
longing for both materiał pleasures and equality that are presently beyond their 
grasp and that set them ever on the move. At the same time, they are insecure in 
what they already have and their restive motion unravels whatever social ties they
will have hastily established in passing. It is democracy, not merely the market, 
that makes community, or even association, difficult. The more we extend democ­
racy, the more we instill the restive, individualizing desire for materiał goods.
Today, liberals have champions who promise to fight for the people against 
the rich and powerful. What Tocqueville might say to them is that the people are 
better served by being enabled to fight for themselves, under a government that 
directs its energies to shoring up the social and political institutions and habits that 
make it necessary and possible for citizens to “associate” -  or, in today’s parlance, 
to participate.
Tocqueville reserves his most somber rhetoric for a description of a de­
mocracy in which citizens are shepherded into his famous “mild despotism”, under 
which power is exercised by “school-master” administrators. Such a govemment 
may be well meaning, competent, and effective. But its great appeal is that it 
promises, with all compassion, to make citizens secure and to promote their happi- 
ness, while depriving them, he says sarcastically, of “the pain of living” and “the 
trouble of thinking”.
Modem liberals resemble to some extent the eighteenth-century intellectu- 
als whom Tocqueville analyzed in his later book, The Old Regime. These intellec- 
tuals were determined to rationalize human life with the aid of new scientific 
knowledge. To this end they were eager to do away with traditional authority and 
institutions, replacing them with a simplified, centralized administration cleansed 
of partisan politics. Consumed with ambition themselves, they failed to recognize 
or prize it in others. Their rationalism did not take account of the irrational in hu­
man passions, and thus in its political effects turned out to be a new kind of irra- 
tionalism that stifles rather than oppresses. Our liberals today have a similar over- 
confidence in a similar social science, with its focus on security, its preference for 
centralization, its tendency to simplify problems as well as solutions.
Democratic America, Tocqueville contends, has other, better schools, open 
to all, and free of charge -  its political institutions, both formal and informal. Local 
govemments, epitomized by the New England township, are “primary schools” of 
freedom, where one acquires the taste for freedom, where one acquires the taste for 
freedom and leams habits of freedom. Juries, too, are schools, where the people 
leam how to reign as they reign. In serving, each juror acquires a respect for law, 
for justice, and for everyone’s rights. And in being made to render a verdict, ran- 
domly selected citizens, a dozen at a time, leam to take personal responsibility for 
their actions.
While participating in a vast array of associations -  economic, social, 
morał, intellectual, but especially political -  citizens become accomplished in the 
art and science of association. When individuals pool their efforts, they may be 
able to meet more of their common needs without the assi stance of a strong central 
govemment. They become better prepared to preserve their freedom against gov- 
emment, should that ever be necessary. It is always necessary to enlarge citizens’ 
hearts and minds through participation in associations. Here they expose them- 
selves to the various sentiments and ideas democracy can foster in interested, if not
independent selves, instead of supposing that all are like, as they must do when 
they show their compassion. Finally, each participant leams to subordinate his or 
her will to common purposes, as members of a free community should. Especially 
in political associations, which aspire to the formidable goal of goveming society, 
they can see just how worthwhile it might be to make the effort needed to succeed 
at associating. As Tocqueville presents associations, they are the people’s best 
hope for becoming the rich and powerful themselves.
Conservatives are right to accept the inevitability of self-interest and the 
need to understanding it well, and wrong to trust too much in either the market or 
religion as individual solutions to public problems. Liberals are right when they 
worry about the well-being of the community as a whole, and wrong when they 
trust more in compassionate govemment than in the on-the-job training of demo- 
cratic politics. Neither conservatives nor liberals say enough about what they as 
partisans experience: the extent to which their partisanship confirms and corrects 
the point of view of each party and shows the necessity of the other.
Liberals do not have much to say about the political ambition that drives 
some of them to seek public office in liberał communities; and conservatives too 
have trouble understanding ambition from the standpoints of homo economicus or 
homo religiosus. Tocqueville grants that democracy tends to impoverish ambition 
by putting it in the service of crass materialism or vulgar self-indulgence. Yet he 
also finds in democratic politics the potential to keep ambition vigorous and 
healthy, to diffuse it widely, and to make the self-interest of the rich or powerful 
beneficial to everyone. Out of self-interest, rich or eminent men who would curry 
popular favor to gain political office will dissemble their selfishness and pride. 
Eventually, what begins as a calculated, feigned desire to fight for the people’s 
interest in generał prosperity may be transformed by the pleasurable experience of 
winning an election and reelection, becoming a matter of habit and choice, even of 
self-imposed obligation. So defenders of self-interest might look to politics to en- 
lighten that interest. And those who oppose self-interest in the name of community 
might come to see that communities actually need more vigorous self-interest in 
the form of ambition. The more we nourish widespread ambition, the less we have 
to fear the overweening power of mild despotism. In that way we can have more 
govemment and less dependency.
Both conservatives and liberals have something to Ieam from Tocqueville 
on religion. He addresses the political woes of skeptical democratic peoples, who 
are too much given to unstable desires and brief exertions. Tocqueville recom- 
mends that democratic govemments extend the horizons of democratic communi­
ties by setting distant goals to be achieved by moderate, yet steadfast, ambition. 
The seemingly limited goal he specifies is seeing to it that political office comes as 
a reward for skill and effort. But this modest goal is in truth an infmite one. Win­
ning the favor of a democratic electorate with unstable desires will always depend 
to a certain degree on chance, and so it is beyond the capacity of a democracy to 
reward virtue regularly. Partial success comes within reach when political institu- 
tions and mores are well shaped; but without the support of a greater power, the
goal will always remain elusive. But insofar as men can act confidently in the hope 
that their virtue will be rewarded -  accomplishing much along the way -  they will, 
in effect, have retumed to a kind of religious faith from which politics may benefit. 
A democratic electorate can do God’s work by seeing to it, as much as it can, that 
the virtuous are elected. Here is religion in the public sąuare, as conservatives 
want, but not to promote religion, as liberals fear.
